ANALYSIS OF MEMBER STATE CULTURE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS POLICIES (based on Annex I: country Profiles)

Introduction

In conducting the research, six interrelated questions were borne in mind. The analysis therefore uses these six questions in order to draw out evidence from the research. Each question is dealt with in a separate section.

Section I: How open are Member States to a cultural component in EU external relations and foreign policy?

The question of whether the 25 EU Member States are open to a more clearly focused and coordinated cultural component as part of the emerging EU foreign policy could be answered favourably. To demonstrate this, the question needs to be split into two areas of analysis. First, are the Member States open to more coordinated external EU actions? And if so, are they open to there being a ‘cultural component’ to external action?

It was easy to discover, from official statements and information displayed on the websites of all the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, that the answer to the first part of this question was ‘yes’. Of course, the research took us to diplomatic websites and therefore it could be expected that negative statements regarding cooperation with other EU countries in external affairs would not be found. However, the official policy statements of EU Member States concerning external affairs surprised us by being so positive and openly supportive towards coordinated EU external policies. In their written statements, all countries without exception demonstrated support for unified external actions (although Member States may have different ideas about the content of such actions).

In many cases, support for coordinated EU external actions was expressed on the official websites of the Ministries quite explicitly, as documented in Annex I.

Section II: Do the 25 EU Member States already have “European” cultural elements in their national foreign policies?

As demonstrated in section I, no EU Member State seems to have any real objection to coordinated EU external cultural policies and actions. Many appear to be supportive. All countries are already involved in such cooperation to a greater or lesser degree. As EU members, the EU’s policies are their immediate affaires. The fact that nearly all the Member States dedicate substantial areas of their foreign affairs websites to explanations of EU external policy demonstrates this point. All have signed the EU’s Maastricht Treaty and subsequent revised articles (Amsterdam). The next chapter will go into this more fully; for the purposes of this analysis, it should be noted that members agreed to:

“foster cultural cooperation between Member States and with third countries and competent international organisations, in particular the Council of Europe”\(^1\)
Most EU Member States participate in intergovernmental initiatives to build and develop cooperation (including cultural cooperation) in and beyond the European region. This represents a very clear demonstration of European elements in national foreign policies. Annex II provides more detail about the most interesting (in terms of cultural cooperation) of the organisations involved, but a very brief explanation is also given here.

A number of (often regional) intergovernmental European administrative bodies operate in the field of cultural cooperation and include within their membership both European member states and non-European member states. These alliances tend to take place in the European continent or with immediate neighbours. These are legal structures which work together in a significant way to develop cooperation programmes and extend external relations beyond national interests, usually including culture in different ways (Council of the Baltic Sea States, Nordic Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Central European Initiative, Visegrád, Mediterranean Forum).

Certainly the attractiveness of EU funding would help to encourage certain multilateral collaborations, but the willingness to cooperate multilaterally is even more crucial. Evidence of extensive cooperation (as mentioned above) is therefore important since it demonstrates that EU members are not only willing to work multilaterally but are also willing to contribute financially and physically in these endeavours.

Section III: Do the 25 EU Member States have areas of common ground, geographically speaking?

In the analysis of this question, three indicators (among many others) have been used to roughly ascertain geographical priorities. The clearest indicator of geopolitical priority for external cultural cooperation can be found by researching each Member State’s policy statements. In some cases, these geographical priorities referred to policy application generally, across all fields of external policy. Nevertheless, it could be considered that, in most cases – given the broader concept of cultural cooperation which is applied in this study – the general geographical priorities also often apply to cultural practices. Geographical priorities are, however, rather difficult to ascertain. This is because diplomatic statements of policy are largely, by their very nature, careful to remain general and avoid exclusion. However, some emphasis can be seen to be expressed, particularly with regards to special relationships.

A further indicator (used in this study) of geopolitical priorities for external cultural cooperation is the participation of each country in intergovernmental organisations. Annex II provides brief profiles of a number of key intergovernmental organisations which are identified in this study because of their relevance to the field of cultural cooperation. Membership of such organisations requires a commitment both financially and practically from the Ministries. Membership in any of these instruments is not taken lightly and often has financial implications.

The final indicator of geopolitical priorities for external cultural cooperation lies in the literature pertaining to each Member State’s cooperations with third countries. It should be noted that literature specifically on the question of cultural cooperation in external policies for most countries is limited and often out-of-date. Up-to-date digital documents proved to be much more helpful, although most literature gathered could only be relied upon as a source for verifying the results obtained by the other three levels of enquiry.

In some cases, the distribution of official cultural institutions of EU Member States abroad is used as another indicator to identify geographical priorities. However, as this indicator did not produce conclusive results, this is only referred to where the research results are convincing.
With the three levels of enquiry, it could be cautiously suggested that the geographical priorities of EU Member States are not dissimilar and are in harmony with current EU external policy.

**European Union**

Most EU Member States consider cooperation with their fellow EU member countries to be their number one priority. This is especially evident in the ten newer EU countries, but is also true of older members. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, all show strong tendencies towards cooperating within the EU.

In summary, it can be stated that EU countries are united in cooperation with one another, as demonstrated by all official statements attesting support for European cooperation.⁵

**Neighbourhood cooperation**

EU Members are strongly supportive of heightened cooperation with neighbouring countries (see chapter II). In almost all cases, cooperation with neighbouring countries emerges as the second greatest geopolitical priority after inter-EU Member cooperation.

**Euro-Atlantic Alliance**

The USA and Canada are favourite geopolitical zones for cooperation. This is especially true of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK⁶. Interest in cooperation with the US is less marked in Cyprus, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal (which does have agreements, but such cooperation is definitely lower down on the scale of priorities) and Slovenia; however, this should not be overstated.

Canada cooperates with almost all European countries, especially through its “honorary” membership of the Council of Europe. It is therefore a little surprising to note how seldom cultural ties with Canada are mentioned. Only the Netherlands stressed that Canada could provide a strong market with which to build cultural industries and relations. Still, the following European Member States have cultural institutes in Canada: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands” and the UK. It should also be highlighted that the Canadian region of Québec holds special importance in Europe, especially among the Francophone countries such as France and the French Community of Belgium.

**Asia**

Asia is a vast continent with vast economic wealth and vast poverty, almost as diverse as the world at large. It has some of the world’s fastest growing economies – economies with which Europe is increasingly involved and even dependent on. China seems to be the emerging new world power, challenging America’s hegemony; India also has the potential to become so. At the same time, extremely serious challenges for world security (international terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons) are originating mainly in Asia, including the Middle East.

The question of security is underlined repeatedly in official statements of EU Member States, which focus on Asian countries as geopolitical priorities for other than economic reasons. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention the subsequent bombings in Europe and Indonesia, the current ‘crisis’ with Iran, and the clash over cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed, have increased awareness of possible future dangers. It seems, however, that there is general agreement between the EU members and a sense of renewed vigour to develop cultural relations between Asia and Europe. Just one example of this is the special attention being given to improving the dialogue with the Islamic world (which, of course, is not limited to Asia). Germany has run a special programme called “European-Islamic Intercultural Dialogue”, which is designed
to promote exchange and encounter between the West and the Islamic world. It is notable that this is considered a European exchange and not a German-Islamic exchange, despite being initiated and funded solely by Germany.

Africa
Cultural cooperation, in particular with the sub-Saharan African countries, is often (but not invariably) part and parcel of development cooperation policies. For example, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland and the UK all mention development aid programmes in Africa. Culture is not a high priority on the development aid agenda, as more immediate concerns are dealt with in these countries.

However, significant cultural cooperation with North African countries takes place both bilaterally and multilaterally. It is significant that countries associated with the EU Mediterranean Partnership are more liable to manage cultural cooperation programmes with EU Member States.

Latin America and Caribbean countries (LAC)
Brazil holds a great attraction for the cultural cooperation initiatives of the larger EU countries. This is clearly indicated by the large number of cultural institutes housed within Brazil’s borders. France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK all have cultural institutes in Brazil. Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela are the next favourites for cooperation with EU countries, each hosting cultural institutes from at least four EU member countries. However, in general, the ratio of cultural institutes in LAC countries as compared with Africa and Asia is low. It would require more in-depth research into programmes of cultural cooperation to see if this reflects general policy priorities or whether other factors influence this indicator.

Section IV:
What do the Member States consider to be purely national matters?

In the absence of specific resources which could help to answer this question, the study focused on the external policies of the 25 EU Member States in an attempt to identify significant policies carried out at national level and to identify trends and common elements.

The research discovered that the following general (cultural) policies are adopted by most, if not by all, EU Member States in their external relations:

Promotion and dissemination of the national culture
All EU Member States share the legitimate aim of promoting their own national identity. This is natural and supported by the EU. This policy manifests itself in many ways including, for example:

• teaching the national language and culture abroad;
• organising emblematic initiatives abroad which showcase national culture and history;
• producing and distributing publications/information related to projects directly undertaken by government;
• promoting the integration of national artistic events in the international artistic scene;
• touring national cultural products;
• supporting the edition and translation of native language books or didactic and pedagogic instruments and tools.
Support for dialogue and intercultural dialogue

All EU countries agree with the philosophy of “diversity in unity” and cultural diversity is a constitutional element of the European Union. Two-way and multi-way dialogue is becoming increasingly fashionable in policy trends; some policy examples include:

- receiving and training foreign cultural practitioners and artists;
- promoting foreign cultures in their own country;
- supporting multilateral cultural productions;
- using universities as a cultural stage and platform for intercultural dialogue;
- continuing support for intergovernmental initiatives specific to each country (e.g. Portugal and the PALOP organisation), in some cases acting as an interlocutor to bring these institutions closer to the EU in terms of cooperation.

Representation of the national culture in international meetings

This policy needs no explanation. Examples of such meetings where culture is of significance might include:

- representing the Ministry of Culture in international organisations, in particular the EU, UNESCO and the Council of Europe;
- studying and monitoring national and community affairs in the field of legislation and legal proceedings;
- contributing to formal and informal Councils of the Culture and Audiovisual Ministers of the European Union;
- representing the Ministry of Culture in the Intergovernmental Commission for Community Affairs;
- providing representation at summits of Chiefs of State and Heads of Government, ministerial missions abroad and reception of foreign missions in the member state.

Support for émigré communities

In countries with expatriate communities, there is a clear attempt to cooperate more closely with expatriates and help them maintain cultural ties with their homeland, which can involve applying policies which support cultural centres and the dissemination of information from the home country.

Fostering cultural and artistic exchanges

This takes the form of strengthening the development of national arts by supporting collaborative artistic events and the participation of national artists in cultural events and festivals organised both domestically and abroad; and also supporting national artists in making an international career. There is significantly less but still some noticeable support for international and European arts touring in Europe.

Promoting national membership of the EU

Promoting a nation’s own membership of the EU is not always strongly evident, but is nevertheless present in all Member States’ external policies. Belonging to the EU family is perhaps more important to some states than others. However, policies such as the promotion of
European cinema abroad or the dissemination of European literature are extremely relevant to the countries which participate in these initiatives.

The shared use of cultural institutes and cultural infrastructure

A small amount of evidence suggests that some EU Member States are cooperating by sharing the use of existing cultural infrastructure, promoting shared exhibitions and supporting collaborative creative initiatives which show cooperation among EU Member States.

The above general and certainly not hierarchical list of policies indicates that, while there is still a strong basis for continued national external policy instruments, many ‘national external policies’ are already and increasingly being carried out at a multilateral level. Support for multilateral actions or actions under the umbrella of EU membership are both evident and growing. It would be interesting to conduct a reality check in order to discover more about the motivations and objectives driving multilateral collaborations with third countries.

Section V:
Do the 25 EU Member States have inter-state arguments or conflicts which may hinder the finding of common ground for cultural cooperation in foreign policy?

It is not easy to tell from diplomatic websites if there are old problems which may hinder the deepening of cooperation. Such would have to be deduced from interviews and the indications of actual budget provisions.

However certain age-old perceptions of conflicts between EU Member States were looked at more closely. For example, the public may still hold the view that Greece would block Turkey’s accession to the EU, but in foreign affairs circles this view is not even considered. In fact, a very different picture emerges from an inspection of Greece’s official statements of support for Turkey’s accession to the EU. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005), “The Greek Presidency will energetically strive to further strengthen the accession strategy for Turkey. The Turkish government will be encouraged and supported in its declared policy of reform and democratisation”.

Another view which might be held by the general public is that Poland maintains a deep distrust of Germany. However, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs made a clear statement in his address to Parliament in January 2005 that Poland’s priorities should include “seeking jointly with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany a future-oriented formula of relations between our states – a formula that would finally put a closure to the burdens of the past and open qualitatively new prospects for the development of relations between Poland and Germany”. However, it remains to be seen whether the present Polish government, in view of the strongly critical statements made during the recent election campaign, will maintain this conciliatory attitude.

The political and ethnic problems in parts of former Yugoslavia are largely unresolved. In fact, the southern Balkans are still such a ‘hot issue’ that they receive special attention in the DG Enlargement. Despite differences over the handling of the situation which culminated in the war on Iraq, there is no evidence that this division led to fundamental conflicts among the EU Member States which
might interfere with other areas of cooperation. Since all EU countries claim to favour cultural
dialogue, respect and diversity as means of improving understanding and preventing conflict, one
can assume that there will be more external multilateral cultural actions in the future.

In the concerns of the current 25 EU Member States, there are no conflicts which might
hinder the building of cultural cooperation in foreign policy such as would complement national
policies. Economic union, it seems, is a formula for cultural understanding. In fact, the EU is
based on this formula, having been an instrument initially devised to build a common economic
area between France and Germany in order to prevent further conflicts!

Section VI:

Are there common goals (philosophical, social, economic, etc.) which could be used
as arguments for encouraging nation states to welcome a cultural component of EU
foreign policy as an added value to their legitimate national and regional policies?
(Examples of such common goals might be conflict prevention, the development of
cultural industries, a model of Europe as an entity striving for a fair and rule-based
world order, and a willingness to protect diversity.)

A close examination of official statements and policies reveals that, first and foremost, cultural
cooperation (e.g. intercultural dialogue) was cited not only as a desired but a necessary
component, taking into account the increasing concern for security. Secondly, nearly all websites
and official documents discussed the issue of visibility: a clear need is expressed for external
policies to provide visibility for all EU countries, and consequently the notion of promoting a
Europe of ‘cultural diversity’ was also expressed in effect. The fact that all EU members agree
and support European diversity suggests that there would be little to hinder the principles of
external cooperation as long as the principle of ‘diversity’ was sustained. In fact, a Europe of
cultural diversity, if properly managed, could be a very successful programme of external policy,
as it would be progressive and respectful and demonstrate the principles of human rights. Finally,
another role for coordinated external policy seems to be the possibility of opening up routes
towards new economic possibilities; on a practical level, some states even suggested the
possibility of sharing costs and avoiding wasteful expenditure. All of these motives for shared
actions resonated over and over again in the documentation that was reviewed. This chapter,
therefore, looks more clearly at these motives in order to provide evidence in support of these
claims and to understand more fully the relevance of each for cultural cooperation.

Security

Security is a clear concern present in all Foreign Affairs websites. It became apparent that the
role of external cultural policy is no longer confined to simple diplomatic missions. Diplomacy
seems to take on a whole new meaning, and there is an entirely new set of rules and roles for
ministries and governmental bodies. The question of diplomacy is still perhaps vital, but what is
clear is that, in a more volatile world, sending over nice orchestras to impress your host is no
longer enough. EU Member States declare in their own official websites the reasons why they
support coordinated actions. Unsurprisingly, following 11/9 and the Madrid and London
bombings, these reasons are often related to security issues.

The Polish government hosted the Third Summit of the Council of Europe in May 2005, with
the aim of provoking deeper reflection on the state and architecture of security and cooperation in
Europe and in Euro-Atlantic relations. Government information on Polish foreign policy presented
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, states: “First, we shall continue
consolidating our place in the European Union as a responsible state, for which the Common
Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy is a platform, on the
one hand, for seeking a balance of interests, and on the other – for overcoming the still existent divisions and preventing new ones.”

The Czech Republic’s website mirrors the sentiments of many others when it states that the primary aim of Czech foreign policy is to “promote and protect national interests, including the wider context of peaceful, unified, stable, safe and prosperous Europe.”

Greece firmly believes that lasting peace and stability in the Balkans can be achieved only through economic development and the strengthening of democratic institutions, as well as respect for existing borders, for the rights of minorities and for human rights in general. Intercultural dialogue is, therefore, in the interests of security, an important element of policy.

Security per se can take on many (and not necessarily cultural) aspects. It was interesting to note, therefore, that cultural dialogue was expressed as a policy aim on nearly all the official websites of the EU Member States. Furthermore, the role of intercultural dialogue is of growing importance to states that are becoming increasingly aware of society’s multicultural nature and the need to forge understanding, cohesion and mutual respect between countries, particularly those countries that have strong links to Diasporas or immigrants within Europe. Questions have been raised as to whether the relationship between the motives of the London bombers and a lack of cultural dialogue could be a factor that needs consideration in the aftermath debates.

Visibility
Smaller countries with a lesser capacity for external actions show clear, focused support for unified actions. For example, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Malta and Cyprus all expressed in their official statements that cooperating within the external policies of the EU increases the possibilities of external visibility for them. There is a sense in which the EU is a vehicle which will help ‘open the world’ to them in a way that they could not manage separately. For smaller countries, the possibility of being able to be involved or to claim involvement with a number of countries through the external actions of the EU (which would be physically or financially impossible for them otherwise) makes EU external policy an attractive option.

Even that most Euro-sceptic of Member States, the UK, shows significant signs that attitudes are shifting. The statement on the role of the International Unit of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport of the UK government states: “The International Unit was established to address the need to take a broader, cross-sectoral view of the Department’s work and to provide a more integrated approach to policy development on the European Union and international fronts. Its establishment is also a response to the Prime Minister’s call to Ministers and officials to improve working relations with counterparts abroad, especially European Union partners. The aim is to make DCMS more effective and efficient in dealing with international issues.”

Diversity
Only France, perhaps, was less explicit in its support of cooperative external actions. Here the official websites focused quite strongly and legitimately on promoting French culture and language in the name of preserving cultural diversity (particularly in the face of globalisation). While the evidence proves that France is open to cultural cooperation in all levels of actions with other EU states, it is clear that EU external action will have to be decisive in promoting the cultural diversity of Europe in order to gain France’s whole-hearted support.

France is not alone. ‘Diversity’, as an issue, appears as an important factor in many nation-state admissions. Outward support for a Europe of “cultural diversities” is certainly agreed upon by all the EU countries. Ambassador Emil Brix, Head of the Cultural Policy Section of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Austria, is quoted as saying: “Acting as a mouthpiece for a Europe of diversity, efforts in this field must concurrently aim at preventing an excessive focus on policies
promoting national identity. An open-minded approach to cultural work implies creating interest groups above and beyond the issues of national identity.” However, he concludes by stating that “Europe’s strength lies to a great extent in its cultural diversity”.16

There are still very clear signals that national identity is important to many countries. Nonetheless, all state that their role as part of a Union, while respecting diversity, is solid.

One already sees evidence of this in practice. For example, Germany’s Goethe-Institut is active in eighty countries. In its strategy paper on Europe, the Goethe-Institut states that:

“transnational influences will gain importance. The often dividing function of culture must be replaced by an integrative one.”

Not only does it support European content, it also encourages cooperation with other foreign cultural institutes, embassies and with the civil sector within and beyond the EU. UNESCO and the EU prepared the Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions. All EU countries participated in this process and all agreed on the Convention in October 2005. This is an important area of cultural cooperation even if its implementation, especially with regard to the WTO negotiations, has yet to be seen.

Many EU countries participated in UNESCO’s 1998 Stockholm conference, which formulated five objectives for development policies: promoting political culture as a key strategic factor in development; promoting creativity and participation in cultural life; reinforcing the protection of cultural heritage and promoting the cultural industries; promoting cultural and linguistic diversity; and increasing human and financial resources for development.

The greatest challenge for Europe will be to find the right balance in the promotion of all 25 European cultures (not to mention regional cultures). The significance of the fact that several Member States experienced a period of nation-building which destroyed or tried to homogenise cultures should not be underestimated. It is natural that these countries should demonstrate, at least among the general public, some suspicion that a supra-culture is being built.

**New economic possibilities**

Furthering new economic possibilities, especially through the development of the creative industries, also stood out in a number of Member States’ policy statements. Culture is obviously high on the agenda in terms of new creative industries. In Austria, for instance, the chief motives for developing cultural cooperation seem to be to place Austria on the map as “a central and pivotal country within Europe and emphasise Austria’s strengths in creative media technology”.

Some Danish actors argue that the strengthening of cooperation at European level should focus on cultural production since cultural production is an increasingly important part of the global economy. The stimulation and enhancement of cultural coordination and cooperation at European level should thus contribute to an increased focus on culture as a ‘trade’ with a huge branding and export potential.

**Sharing costs**

As statements in several official documents and websites by smaller but also larger EU countries (such as the UK and Germany) implicitly or explicitly reveal, another factor which might attract support for increased European cultural coordination and cooperation is the reduction in costs that would result from sharing infrastructure and capitalising on cooperation networks and joint projects. Finland, as a typical example, fears that tightening budget lines due to EU convergence criteria will lead to a diminishing capacity for responding to new challenges in transnational cultural cooperation. It maintains that, for instance, EU delegations can play a role as a broker of initiatives, a central provider of information, and a promoter of cultural cooperation with third countries, thereby allowing the resources of the Member States to be used more effectively.18
There is an additional economic reason which is not identified as a goal but is in line with many policy objectives to support artist mobility. This is encapsulated in the draft policy of the Irish Arts Council, which states: “We recognise that the opportunity to work in an international context is crucial to many artists and arts organisations. In the past, international activity meant simply the presentation of work abroad and was regarded as a bonus or an extra. In the current environment, the international context informs all aspects of artistic activity. International activity includes work undertaken abroad, collaborations with international partners, exchange programmes, participation in the international network, and presentation of international artists.”

This need for artists and art practitioners to conduct and collaborate in international artistic work is on the increase throughout Europe. Yet budget lines to support such collaborations are increasing only marginally if at all. Certainly, the pace of budget increases for international work is not in keeping with the increased ambitions of artists and practitioners.

Notes
2 Other indicators might be the provision and activity of cultural departments of embassies and consulates, and the use and application of bilateral or multilateral agreements. These, although very relevant, have not been included in this study because their application in the cultural cooperation field varies greatly and would require much more detailed research into the cultural practices and budgets of each embassy and consulate. Such a detailed level of research would go beyond the scope of this study, which was confined to desk research. Similarly, the activities of non-governmental organisations (often funded by government) could not be studied in this phase of the research despite the fact that this would give a very valuable indication of the geographical priorities of Member States.
3 The results given by these indicators must be treated with caution and any conclusions drawn from them can only be vague ones, as there are many other indicators or hidden factors which should be considered in order to understand the geographical priorities of Member States more fully. A reality check is needed.
4 It would require further research to determine if there were departures from main external policy in the areas of cultural cooperation. All website and document links to official statements used in this analysis can be found listed in each Country’s profile (Section I) of the LRT and Annex I of this report.
5 More information on inter-European intercultural cooperation is available in the Interarts/EFAH study.
6 The USA houses cultural institutes from the following EU Member States: Austria (2), Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany (9), Hungary, Italy (5), the Netherlands, Poland, Spain (3), Sweden and the UK.
7 The Netherlands has an embassy office with cultural attachés servicing the role of a cultural institute.
10 Rotfeld, Prof. Adam Daniel, (2005) Government information on the Polish foreign policy, E-Doc Link: http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php?page=1020200001 Poland Government information on the Polish foreign policy presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, at the session of the Sejm on 21st January 2005: “...I wish to present a list of priorities on the agenda of our foreign policy. First, we shall continue consolidating our place in the European Union as a responsible state, for which the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy is a platform, on the one hand, for seeking a balance of interests, and on the other – for overcoming the still existent divisions and preventing new ones....”
11 (2005) Concept of Foreign Policy for the 2003 - 2006 Period,
This document sets out the Czech Republic’s foreign policy and priority areas. Although it was written before EU accession, it has allowed for policy following accession.

According to the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece favours a federal model for Europe and is open to developing policy models in cooperation with others. According to a study by the “Euro-Barometer”, 67% of Greeks are in favour of EU Enlargement. Greece’s support is most evident in the second 5-year Programme of Hellenic Development Aid for the economic reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB).

CIRCLE Round Table, Metropolis of Europe, Urban cultural life and inter-city cultural interactions for cultural diversity, 23rd-24th September 2005. Discussions emerged as to the role of inter-state cultural dialogue and inter-city security in Europe.

According to the official website of the Ministry of Culture of the Czech Republic, the Ministry works through EU programmes in a number of countries.


This document briefly explains the brief of the international unit of DCMS.


Halm, 2003

See Annex I, p.66-69.